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Abstract. Critical infrastructures must be better protected against chal-
lenges to their data communications in the face of increasing numbers of
emerging challenges, complexity and society’s demand and intolerance of
failures. In this paper, we present a set of challenges and their charac-
teristics by reviewing reported incidents. Using domain specific attributes
we discuss how these could be mitigated. We advocate the adoption of the
latest programmable networking approaches in critical infrastructure net-
works and we present our proposed modular architecture with configurable
monitoring and security components. Lastly, we show results from a net-
work challenge simulation which highlights the benefits of our approach in
providing rapid, precise and effective challenge detection and mitigation.
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1 Introduction
Data communication networks are playing an increasingly pivotal role in criti-
cal infrastructures. Society is becoming ever more reliant on critical infrastruc-
tures to manage a range of services including communications, power and trans-
portation. It is therefore necessary that the underlying data networks of such
infrastructures remain highly resilient and available in the face of emerging chal-
lenges. Data networks worldwide are becoming progressively interconnected and
explicitly, critical infrastructures are becoming less isolated, e.g., EU Air Trans-
portation systems are increasing their interconnectivity through an international
Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM) system [2]. In this paper, we
argue that critical infrastructure data networks are encountering a series of
emerging challenges. We discuss the motivation for increasing data communi-
cation resilience and the domain specific attributes of critical infrastructures we
can exploit, in Section 2. In Section 3, we review reported incidents within our
focussed context of mission-critical Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems. By
analysing these incidents and considering other possible scenarios, we have char-
acterised a taxonomy of emerging challenges and their features. In order to best
take advantage of the attributes of critical network infrastructures (CNI), we
argue for the introduction of the latest programmable networking approaches,
specifically Software Defined Networking (SDN). SDN allows centralised, logical
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control of data traffic routing. This offers unique opportunities as event based
code can be executed in response to real-time network behaviour, e.g. allowing
the controller to enforce different policies depending on the traffic type. Using our
domain specific knowledge and familiarity with SDN, we argue that the typical
qualities of many CNIs can be exploited using tailored algorithms on SDN-based
architectures that will allow them to better mitigate such challenges than would
be possible in other data networks. We then present our vision of a modular
architecture in Section 4 and discuss how it can be utilised to improve resilience.
Our final contribution, in Section 5, is an initial experiment which highlights the
benefits of our architecture, and SDN, when detecting and remediating against
a flooding challenge, before concluding the paper.
2 Characteristics of Critical Network Infrastructures
Data networks within critical infrastructures have certain characteristics that
hold true more predominately than for data networks in general. Firstly, they
should be highly redundant with respect to both topology and services. Secondly,
any changes are perceived as high risk. Finally, high availability and low latency
are required. These three attributes converge neatly. To achieve high availability,
there should be significant redundancy. Low latency requires over-provisioning
and considerate routing strategies for queueing and congestion. To make changes
to a system undermines the experienced reliability to date as unknown conse-
quences can occur. Leaving the system unchanged is therefore perceived as the
best means to maintain achieved levels of high availability. This means traffic
patterns and topologies are relatively static in comparison with the ad-hoc, ever-
changing behaviour of the legacy Internet. As technology is advancing and some
changes are being made, such as reducing the relative isolation of critical infras-
tructures, it is now time to make further, protective, changes to safeguard critical
infrastructure data network’s resilience. As evidence for the increasing interde-
pendency of systems we refer to the new EU networked system to directly share
collaborative flight planning data among different systems and countries [2] and
for a comprehensive overview of CNI’s interdependencies in general, see [13].
The complexity of critical infrastructure communication networks is rising
as they age. Current data networks are moving larger bandwidths of data traffic
and systems are processing ever greater volumes of data. This trend continues
as capacity improves and as demand increases for more knowledge of the sys-
tem with more intelligent data correlations. Modern critical infrastructures often
have diverse technologies integrated into the overall system. This has come from
building improvements onto legacy components and adapting new technology to
interface with existing protocols.
2.1 Energy and Communication Resilience
Critical infrastructures rely on power and communications in order to maintain
mission-critical services. These two components are often interconnected with
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Fig. 1. Depiction of the layers of dependency in critical infrastructure systems
energy required to power communications and a communications network re-
quired to manage, monitor and control the power systems. Nearly all elements
of critical infrastructures require both power and communications to perform
their function. In Figure 1, we present our view of the functional hierarchy of
components required to effectively provide the services which comprise critical
infrastructures. The pyramid requires the underlying components to be in place
to offer the services at higher layers. We differentiate between energy the CI
national grid supply, and the power required for an individual CI to function
internally. Capacity, safety, security, automation and resilience engineering fall
between basic needs and advancing current research. Systems intergration, real-
time processing and optimisation form the pinnacle of current CI research.
Given the relationship discussed above, power and communications can be
categorised together. However, as we discuss in previous work [19], the chal-
lenges faced in communications resilience are greater. Power supplies are source-
independent, with energy needs being met from mains, back-up generators and
even fail-safe battery power in the worst case. Voltage spikes or brown outs can
be mitigated using standard techniques such as Diesel Rotary Uninterruptible
Power Supplies which convert the power to a steady, clean stream in terms of
phase, harmonic distortion and consistent voltage. Communications resilience
is a more sophisticated problem as it is time-critical for real-time applications
and the content is source-dependent. Communication payloads are a complex,
non-Poisson process of traffic load and arrivals. This implies high variability and
unpredictable dynamics over long timescales. Traffic peaks can also be significant
in terms of utilisation, even with substantial over-provisioning. Data packets are
also susceptible to corruption, loss and delay. We therefore argue there is strong
motivation to place a greater emphasis on communications resilience to ensure
the same levels of reliability and availability as are present in power resilience.
3 Examples of CNI Challenges
Numerous challenges threaten the failure of critical infrastructures. We have de-
fined a generalised taxonomy of characteristics for a series of accidental failures
and malicious attacks which can be categorised together. We base this categori-
sation on the behaviour of the challenge in the data network, the characteristics
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of CNIs can be exploited to defend against such challenges and the existence of
past incidents which are an instance of such a challenge or allude to the scenario
being a possible, legitimate threat. The challenges in this partial taxonomy are
representative because they have a similar manifestation but with different impli-
cations. There are also common attributes we can use to detect these challenges
which we review after presenting our taxonomy. We consider:
– Flooding:
• Distributed Flood
• Centralised Flood
– Disconnectivity
– Oscillation
– Network Scan
Flooding: Network flooding is where a large amount of data overwhelms the
available capacity of the network resources, e.g., in terms of physical bandwidth.
Other types of flooding exist such as SYN flooding, where a large number of TCP
flows are simultaneously sent to a remote server initiating the connection proto-
col. The server sends TCP SYN-ACK and awaits ACK replies for each of these
flows, before running out of memory, thus stopping new connections being made.
We distinguish between two types of flooding: distributed and centralised. Dis-
tributed floods are well-known for causing Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks, Flashcrowds and Botnets. These challenges have a distributed source
address space and a concentrated destination address space. Centralised floods
begin from a focussed point in the network and can have a single root cause.
They may however propagate, such as a case of a broadcast storm, where network
devices forward data packets to all connected devices, as instructed, resulting in
an endless flow of traffic. Characteristics of this type of flooding are a concen-
trated source address space and a concentrated destination address space. These
are well known challenges and many solutions exist to mitigate them in generic
network environments [10].
Disconnectivity: Disconnectivity is where part of the network infrastruc-
ture is no longer available. This may be due to hardware, e.g., a physical link
or switch going down or software misconfiguration of a firewall or routing ta-
ble errors. The threat of failure from a disconnectivity challenge is independent
of its cause. While it is important to rapidly diagnose and isolate the cause of
the problem, in terms of overall system availability, it is more important to un-
derstand the impact of the challenge. Depending on where the disconnectivity
arises, this may mean an alternative path between parts of the network experi-
ences higher traffic levels as data is rerouted around the problem area or it may
mean parts of the network are entirely isolated. Characteristics of this challenge
will likely be a significant drop in traffic in some parts of the infrastructure, a
similarly significant rise in traffic in other parts, as well as the potential creation
of additional routing paths throughout the network.
Oscillation: Link redundancy is a core feature of mission-critical networks.
Even in simple topologies, persistent routing oscillations can occur. This chal-
lenge makes understanding normal behaviour complex and is bad for stability,
load balancing, reliability, predictability and fault detection [4]. It also degrades
router performance and makes monitoring data harder to interpret. Finally,
anomaly detection methodologies are also hampered since many rely on trends
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or sampling [1], and the characteristics of oscillation are bursty traffic conditions
and routing table variability.
Network Scan: Network scans and other distributed attacks such as Ex-
ploits and Worms can be categorised together with common characteristics of a
distributed destination address space, focussing on a limited set of destination
ports. These challenges exploit network vulnerabilities and are malicious attacks.
In traditional networks firewalls and network monitoring tools offer some pro-
tection against these attacks.
While distinct, there are common aspects to which can be used to optimally
detect these challenges, particularly when in an SDN environment. The key
aspect for this taxonomy is the desire to have both distributed and centralised
knowledge to detect and mitigate the challenge. Flooding incidents require rapid
identification of the source of the traffic. This can be achieved through a dis-
tributed alarms which recognise flood traffic, and centralised control which can
determine if the event is localised, distributed or propagating throughout the
network. Similarly, disconnectivity requires both distributed knowledge of local
behaviour as well as a global perspective to determine where the cause is and
whether any parts of the network are now completely isolated. Oscillation can
occur at various scales or across local domains making it necessary to examine
at both levels. Finally, network scans vary and depending on their nature may
be obscured at either a local or global level. If a network scan is mounted in a
distributed address space attacking the same port, this requires a centralised de-
tection algorithm. However, if a port scan is targeting a concentrated destination
address space and examining each of its ports, this can be handled locally.
3.1 Review of CNI Incidents
To provide evidence for our claims of the challenges facing critical infrastruc-
tures we explore recent incidents involving Air Traffic Transportation Systems.
The following four incidents highlight the severity of the impact faced when
challenges do undermine the resilience of ATM data networks and therefore the
safety and security of the service which relies upon them.
In 2007, the US Customs and Border Protection computer systems at LAX
suffered from a network outage [8]. The fault analysis concluded the single ini-
tial point of failure was caused by a malfunctioning Network Interface Card
(NIC). This in turn caused data to overload the system. This system is not di-
rectly involved in ATM services however, the 10-hour-long issue caused delays
and congestion affecting up to 17,000 passengers with new arrivals not being al-
lowed to disembark, and international departure disruptions. Analysis suggests
this incident had similar characteristics to a centralised flooding challenge which
propagated throughout the network.
In 2008, a European airport ATM system experienced a similar incident
caused by an intermittent faulty NIC. This fault and the subsequent error of
automated network software designed to mitigate anomalous issues ultimately
caused periods of complete airport closure due to safety concerns. The seven week
period over which problems persisted included times where ATM lost track of
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Fig. 2. Modular SDN architecture with distributed, configurable monitoring & security
planes or associated flight information [5]. This was a complex incident with
multiple factors involved, however, the root cause gives further evidence to the
threat faced from flooding challenges.
The FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) Telecommunications Infrastruc-
ture (FTI) experienced a four-hour outage in 2009 causing disruption for over
800 flights [3]. The incident was a series of cascading events which culminated in
failure. Earlier scheduled maintenance led to a routing table being programmed
incorrectly. This was inactive until it was restarted. Independently, alarms mon-
itoring router utilisation had been inadvertently disabled for all routers. The
lack of an alarm system compounded the routing error and a significant delay
occurred while network engineers manually probed the network to localise the
problem and eventually determine which router was at fault. Given a routing
failure scenario such as this and the potential for human error due to manual
programming, it is probable severe oscillation incidents can occur as well as sig-
nificant flooding, in order to have router utilisation exceeding alarm thresholds.
Most recently, a fire caused disconnectivity at a core FAA PoP (Point of Pres-
ence) in Atlantic City in 2012 [12]. The building was evacuated and caused some
air traffic and flight planning systems in the U.S. to become temporarily un-
available. The ATM service was significantly slowed. Back-up systems relied on
telephones for communications. This incident was well-managed but highlights
that despite high levels of redundancy, disconnectivity is a very real threat and
the challenge of continuing operations seamlessly in the face of disrupted infras-
tructure connectivity cannot be guaranteed.
4 Proposed CNI Architecture
In order to better tackle the threat of failure that the emerging challenges we
have outlined present, we argue that the latest networking technologies should
Using Programmable Data Networks to Detect CI Challenges
be introduced into ATM data networks. By applying SDN as the foundations
for our proposed architecture, numerous advantages can be gained. We believe
that by augmenting SDN functionality with our specific architecture, distributed
algorithms can be tailored to exploit critical infrastructure attributes to better
defend against a wide array of future challenges including those in our taxonomy.
To begin, we will introduce the benefits of an SDN approach alone and then we
will discuss our proposed additions which further increase resilience.
4.1 SDN for Critical Infrastructures
SDN is a networking approach which separates the data and control planes.
The data plane handles the forwarding of network traffic to the correct desti-
nation space while the control plane handles the decision on how traffic should
be routed. There is a single logical controller, which may be physically dis-
tributed, which sets control plane rules in the flow tables of switches. These
rules match packets which arrive at the switch. If the information in the packet
header matches a rule, the switch performs the associated action, e.g., forwards
the packet on the data plane. If there is no match, the packet is sent to the con-
troller which can decide to establish a new rule and install it on the switch. The
controller can modify existing rules and actions can be set to discard, forward
packets to their destination or send them to the controller to handle. There has
been a great deal of work on various related aspects of network functionality in
an SDN environment including anomaly detection techniques [9, 20], integrating
different approaches to monitoring and security services [16, 17], network verifi-
cation [6] and automatic failure recovery [7]. OpenFlow, a protocol specification
which is layered on top of TCP, is the first standard communications interface
defined between the control and forwarding layers of an SDN architecture. It re-
lies on Open vSwitches with routing flow tables. The POX OpenFlow controller
and others [14], allow operators to specify event-based functionality.
Of the many advantages SDN brings to a network operator, those of most spe-
cific interest to critical infrastructures include: vendor-independent centralised
management and control; centralised and automated management of network
devices allowing uniform policy enforcement thus reducing configuration errors
and increasing network reliability and security; fine-grained control of varying
services, users, devices and application policies; improved automation and man-
agement by using common APIs to manipulate the underlying network behaviour
for provisioning systems and applications [11].
Crucially, SDN is vendor-independent and can therefore be used on a variety
of different devices. This is advantageous since, as we discussed earlier, many of
the CNIs comprise a mixture of legacy systems, conversion networking devices
and differing manufacturer equipment. Further related work [15], which sepa-
rates a physical network infrastructure into different logical networks could be
of significant interest to critical infrastructures when it matures. SDN technol-
ogy could allow changes to be test-deployed alongside operational CNIs in the
same environment as a final safeguard before migration from the testbed to live
deployment.
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4.2 An SDN Architecture for ATM
While OpenFlow offers an excellent environment to explore some of the advan-
tages of SDN we believe more can be achieved to aid safety and security through
an SDN approach. With increasing bandwidths and data processing, anomaly
detection is requiring faster processing in order to be effective in a real-time
context. We propose that to achieve truly optimised, efficient anomaly detection
for critical infrastructures, the processing of detection methodologies should be
distributed. To achieve this, switches would require more resources, however we
argue this is a realistic proposition for two reasons: the costs of computing com-
ponents are reducing and with the separation of control and data planes through
SDN there are far greater possibilities for distributing anomaly detection algo-
rithms. We therefore believe the cost-benefit trade-off for this architecture is now
in favour of distributed anomaly detection, particularly to exploit the environ-
ment of CNIs. In Figure 2 we show our modular approach to an SDN architecture
for critical infrastructures, which has centralised knowledge and distributed intel-
ligence. Open vSwitches are configured by an SDN controller as standard. Hosts
are connected to Open vSwitches by 2-fold physically redundant links: Links A
& B. The novelty of our architecture comes from the configurable monitoring
and security modules. These are pre-tested modules which can be deployed on-
demand by network operators to perform a task given the current status of the
network. This distributed approach allows network operators to have the free-
dom and control over their resources to respond to challenges as they emerge.
When an incident unfolds, operators want to learn more in real time. This archi-
tecture offers them the ability to do that rapidly. If a given threat is presumed
to be causing a problem in the network, security detection or defence modules
specific to that threat can be deployed to a given switch to gain further infor-
mation and attempt to self-heal. Similarly, if detailed performance information
is desired prior to, for example, network upgrades, a suite of monitoring tools
can be deployed throughout the network to learn about the localised behaviour
in that part of the infrastructure. Figure 2, also details an SDN-trap. We define
this as an asynchronous message from the switch to the controller which could
be used to alert the controller that anomalous behaviour has been identified.
5 Flood Detection and Remediation Experiment
To prove the merits of our architecture we implemented a flooding detection
and remediation experiment based on challenge characteristics and our domain
specific knowledge. This experiment is designed to show the advantages and po-
tential which can be leveraged for critical infrastructures using our SDN-based
architecture and early feasibility results. We simulated a scale version of a major
European Air Navigation Service Provider’s (ASNP) secondary radar surveil-
lance network. In Figure 3, we show our experimental topology. The core of the
network is a ring connecting switches S1, S2 and S3. These switches represent the
primary ATM locations throughout the country. H1, H2 and H3 represent the
subscribers to the surveillance data to, for example, display where aircraft are
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Fig. 3. Flooding experiment on scaled ANSP radar surveillance network topology
located on Air Traffic Controller displays. In reality these hosts are in fact large
Local Area Networks (LANs) with their own layers of redundancy. In Figure 3,
the core ring network connecting switches S1, S2 and S3 has a high bandwidth
and shares the captured radar data from the distributed radar locations, repre-
sented here as H4, H5 and H6. Each radar dish has a local switch which sends
dual copies of the output data on the Red and Green links which represent the
2-fold physical redundancy in the network. Each switch is configurable through
the centralised SDN controller.
5.1 Methodology
To begin, standard operational traffic was initiated in the network with H4, H5
and H6 sending their continual radar data to the core ring via the Red and
Green links to S1 and S3, respectively. The operational traffic was modelled
from recordings of live data which we analysed in our previous work [19]. As
the standard traffic began, the POX controller performed its default behaviour,
establishing flow table entries for the switches on the core ring, allowing their
associated hosts to directly route traffic to each other. Flow table rules were also
installed on the radar switches S4, S5 and S6 to allow them to send traffic from
their hosts to H1 and H3.
In our controller, we implemented a traffic metric polling for each switch to
provide the number of flows, the number of bytes and the number of packets
sent from that switch to each destination address. This polling was triggered by
a timer event every five seconds. From our knowledge of surveillance networks
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and following the static characteristics of critical infrastructure data networks,
we determined that new connections between pairs of devices which had never
previously exchanged data is a relatively rare event in this domain. Once the
network is established and the controller has installed flow table entries for stan-
dard operational traffic patterns, new connections to send data from e.g. H4
to H5, are unlikely. We exploited this characteristic to better detect a flooding
challenge in the network. Every time a packet is sent to the controller and a new
flow table entry is installed on a switch, we add this forwarding rule into a list
of the latest added routes. Each time a timer event is called, we examine the
number of new routes which are added in the network. If this number exceeds
a given threshold for new connections made, this indicates abnormal behaviour
within the network. Such behaviour could be representative of a network scan,
centralised flood or disconnectivity challenges. By then checking for a significant
increase in the volume of data sent from this switch via the polled traffic metrics,
we can determine a centralised flooding incident. The algorithm used is:
On Timer Event:
for each Switch in Latest Route Entries:
if number of new routes for this Switch > MAX_NEW_ROUTES_THRESHOLD:
if significant traffic volume increase:
Throw Flood Characteristics Alert
else: Throw Generic Alert
On completion of checking the latest route entries we archive them. Any new
flow table entries created in the next time period will be evaluated independently
of archived results. This is based on the profile of a flooding event typically being
a rapid process in which a malfunction or misconfiguration rapidly causes data
to be sent from a constrained set of sources to a large set destinations. When
our system throws a flood characteristic event, we pass the details of the switch,
its latest routes and the traffic volumes. The controller then exposes these alerts
which can be collected by a network monitoring system and reviewed through
e.g. a web based user interface such as KSWatch [18]. Network operators could
then act using our modular architecture to block flows from this switch, increase
detection in other parts of the network and perhaps deploy further monitoring
in the affected areas of the infrastructure to ensure normal behaviour is restored.
5.2 Results and Discussion
With typical operational data flowing in our simulated experiment, we intro-
duced a flooding incident from H6 as seen in Figure 4. This was performed using
iperf in UDP mode for a prolonged 60 second burst at 5x operational traffic
levels to all hosts on the network: H1 to H5. Our experiment parameters were
set with MAX NEW ROUTES THRESHOLD=2. As the UDP flows began, the
controller added new routes from H6 to H2, H4 and H5 (routes to H1 and H3 are
already present). This took place within a five second timer event. After the flood
had initiated, the next time the timer event was triggered, a Flood Character-
istic Alert was successfully thrown to the network monitoring at the controller.
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Fig. 4. Results of flooding and detection time plotted against normal operational traffic
Considering the lengthy outages which have occurred through flooding events in
the past, we believe that this prototype experiment and our architecture shows
strong potential for better securing and increasing reliability of critical infras-
tructures in the future.
Other techniques to detect flooding incidents exist of course. Preventative ap-
proaches such as VLAN isolation or another means of blocking access between
hosts could be implemented, e.g., firewalls. However, flooding is one challenge
from many in the set we have identified. While other techniques exist, the im-
plementation of these can involve manually distributed hard-coding of policies
which can be overly restrictive and unresponsive. Our architecture places the
network operators in greater direct, responsive control of their network since
they have the ability to deploy distributed modules tailored to the scenarios
they perceive unfolding. We argue, our approach allows for greater flexibility
and security with faster results than typical monitoring provides. In our expe-
rience, many network operators rely upon Simple Network Monitoring Protocol
(SNMP) based network monitoring applications which typically poll network
devices once every 15 minutes. While there is always a trade-off amongst the
frequency of monitoring, the traffic this monitoring produces and the desire
not to interfere with operational traffic, we believe our architecture presents
an optimal solution. If additional monitoring is temporarily desired, with more
granular frequency or reviewing a wider set of parameters, this can be deployed
and processed at distributed points throughout the infrastructure, on-demand.
By exploiting the decoupled control plane approach we recognised a flooding
event within a few seconds and presented an alert detailing the switch at the
root cause. The operator then has detailed information and can act rapidly.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented the case for adopting the latest programmable net-
work technologies, specifically SDN, for the control and management of CNI.
We reviewed a series of incidents which affected Air Transportation systems
and distilled a set of applicable challenges and their characteristics. We pre-
sented a novel, modular SDN-based architecture and discussed the results of our
simulated challenge on a scaled network topology, accurately modelled on an
EU radar surveillance network using representative traffic, typical of operational
flows. Our results showed our approach is viable, and coupled with programmable
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networking principles, has strong potential for use in critical infrastructure data
networks to detect challenges and abnormal behaviour. Future work will add to
our simulated environment, creating a scaled version of our complete modular
architecture and we will look at how to deploy security and monitoring com-
ponents over the network on-demand. We intend to explore anomaly detection
algorithms which we can distribute and tailor to exploit the characteristics of the
challenges we present in this paper as well as attributes of critical infrastructures.
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